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1 Introduction
The 73rd Amendment paved the way for a fundamental change in the way public goods are delivered
in rural areas in India. Through the structure of the Panchayati Raj, local councils directly elected
by the people are responsible for making decisions on an array of public good decisions. Twice
a year, the councils must also convene village meetings (Gram Sabhas), where the villagers must
approve their plan and their budget. Eventually, the Gram Panchayats are supposed to be given
control over an even broader array of social services, including basic education and primary health
care. The hope is that decentralization, by bringing decision-making closer to the people, may
improve both the quality of social services delivery in India, which is in many ways disastrous (e.g.,
Probe Team (1999)), and its adequacy to meet people’s needs.
However, in a country with a heterogenous population, a danger is that decentralization will
make it more diﬃcult to protect the interests of weaker segments of the population, notably women,
the Scheduled Castes (SC), and the Scheduled Tribes (ST), and, in particular, to ensure that they
get their fair share of public goods. To alleviate this concern, the 73rd Amendment required
that a fraction of seats at all levels be reserved to women, SCs and STs. While reservations for
SCs and STs are in place in other elected bodies (national and state legislative assemblies), the
73rd Amendment is the ﬁrst one in India that mandated women’s reservation, and this made it a
landmark piece of legislation as well as, to some extent, a test case.1 It also makes an objective
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1There are reservations for women in many other countries, however. Quotas for women in assemblies or on
parties’ candidate lists are in force in the legislation of over 30 countries (World Bank (2001)), and in the internal
1and rigorous analysis of its eﬀects particularly important.
A necessary condition for the eﬃcacy of the reservation policy is that the elected representatives
have independent power and autonomy, over and above not only the direct control of the villagers
(exerted through voting or through the Gram Sabhas), but also above the control of the bureaucracy,
the parties’ hierarchies, and the local elites. Thus, by asking whether or not reservations make a
diﬀerence for political outcomes we can start answering two important questions on the Panchayati
Raj. First, do the Panchayat leaders matter at all? Second, do they make decisions that better
reﬂect the needs of their own groups?
This paper summarizes some of the ﬁndings from our research project on local decentralization
(Chattopadhyay and Duﬂo (2003a), Chattopadhyay and Duﬂo (2003b)).2 We answer these ques-
tions using two data sets we collected in two districts, Birbhum, in West Bengal, and Udaipur, in
Rajasthan. In both places, we conducted detailed village surveys, from which we learned both the
types and the locations of the public goods provided on the ground since the last election. We also
collected data on Gram Sabhas and complaints to the GP (by men and women), and we therefore
know, in each place, what women and men seem to care most about.
A key feature of the reservation policy is that the seats to be reserved were randomly allocated,
which ensures that the only diﬀerence between reserved and unreserved villages is that some of
them were picked to be reserved, while some were not. With a large enough sample, this means
that if we ﬁnd any diﬀerence between the types of goods that are provided in GPs that are reserved
for women Pradhans and in those that are not, this must reﬂect the impact of the policy. We ﬁrst
show that women invest more in goods that are relevant to the needs of local women: water and
roads in West Bengal; water in Rajasthan. They invest less in goods that are less relevant to the
needs of women: non-formal education centers in West Bengal; roads in Rajasthan. In Birbhum,
where we have data on investments in hamlets populated by SCs, STs and the general population
within each village, we also show that SC Pradhans invest a larger share of public goods in SC
hamlets than do non-SC Pradhans.
This research thus shows that some of the fears expressed regarding decentralization are not
founded: Local leaders seem to have some eﬀective control over decisions, even when they are
women or SCs. Moreover, it indicates that the oft-heard anecdotal evidence regarding women
being entirely controlled by their husbands when in oﬃce should not be given too much weight.
Correcting the imbalances in political agency leads to a correction of imbalance in other spheres
as well (Sen (1999)). Reservations of electoral seats may therefore be an eﬀective tool to safeguard
the interest of the weaker groups.
rules of at least one party in 12 countries of the European Union (Norris (2001)).
2More details can be found in these papers.
22 Institutions
2.1 The Panchayat System
The Panchayat is a system of village-level (Gram Panchayat), block-level (Panchayat Samiti),
and district-level (Zilla Parishad) councils, members of which are elected by the people, and are
responsible for the administration of local public goods. Each Gram Panchayat (GP) encompasses
10,000 people in several villages (between 5 and 15). The GPs do not have jurisdiction over urban
areas, which are administered by separate municipalities. Voters elect a council, which then elects
among its members a Pradhan (chief) and an Upa-Pradhan (vice-chief).3 Candidates are generally
nominated by political parties, but have to be residents of the villages they represent. The council
makes decisions by majority voting (the Pradhan does not have veto power). The Pradhan, however,
is the only member of the council with a full-time appointment.
The Panchayat system has existed formally in most of the major states of India since the early
1950s. However, in most states, the system was not an eﬀective body of governance until the
early 1990s. Elections were not held, and the Panchayats did not assume any active role (Ghatak
and Ghatak (1999)). In 1992, the 73rd Amendment to the Constitution of India established the
framework of a three-tiered Panchayat system with regular elections throughout India. It gave the
GP primary responsibility for implementing development programs, as well as in identifying the
needs of the villages under its jurisdiction. Between 1993 and 2003, all major States but two (Bihar
and Punjab) had at least two elections. The major responsibilities of the GP are to administer
local infrastructure (public buildings, water, roads) and identify targeted welfare recipients. The
main source of ﬁnancing is still the state, but most of the money that was previously earmarked
for speciﬁc uses is now allocated through four broad schemes: The Jawhar Rozgar Yojana (JRY)
for infrastructure (irrigation, drinking water, roads, repairs of community buildings, etc.); a small
additional drinking water scheme; funds for welfare programs (widow’s, old age, and maternity
pensions, etc.); and a grant for GP functioning.4 The GP has, in principle, complete ﬂexibility
in allocating these funds. At this point, the GP has no direct control over the appointments of
government-paid teachers or health workers, but in some states (Tamil Nadu and West Bengal, for
example) there are Panchayat-run informal schools.
The Panchayat is required to organize two meetings per year, called “Gram Samsad”. These
are meetings of villagers and village heads in which all voters may participate. The GP council
submits the proposed budget to the Gram Samsad and reports on their activities in the previous six
months. The GP leader also must set up regular oﬃce hours where villagers can lodge complaints
or requests.
In West Bengal, the Left Front (communist) government gained power in 1977 on a platform of
3In Rajasthan, the chief is called a Sarpanch. In this paper, we will use the terminology Pradhan for both states.
4According to the balance sheets we could collect in 40 GPs in West Bengal, the JRY accounts for 30% of total
GP income, the drinking water scheme, 5%, the welfare programs, 15%, the grant for GP functioning, 33%, and the
GP’s own revenue for 8%. GPs can also apply for some special schemes—a housing scheme for SC/STs, for example.
3agrarian and political reform. The major political reform was to give life to a three-tiered Panchayat
electoral system. The ﬁrst election took place in 1978 and elections have taken place at ﬁve-year
intervals ever since. Thus, the system put into place by the 73rd Amendment all over India was
already well established in West Bengal. Following the Amendment, the GP was given additional
responsibilities in West Bengal. In particular, they were entrusted to establish and administer
informal education centers (called SSK), an alternative form of education for children who do not
attend school (a instructor who is not required to have any formal qualiﬁcation teaches children
three hours a day in a temporary building or outdoors).
In Rajasthan, unlike West Bengal, there was no regularly elected Panchayat system in charge
of distribution of state funds until 1995. The ﬁrst election was held in 1995, followed by a second
election in 2000. Since 1995, elections and Gram Samsads have been held regularly, and are well
attended. The setting is thus very diﬀerent, with a much shorter history of democratic government.
As in West Bengal, the Panchayat can spend money on local infrastructure, but unlike in West
Bengal, they are not allowed to run their own schools.
2.2 Reservation for Women, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
In 1992, the 73rd Amendment provided that one-third of the seats in all Panchayat councils, as well
as one third of the Pradhan positions, must be reserved for women. Seats and Pradhan positions
were also reserved for the two disadvantaged minorities in India, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes, in the form of mandated representation proportional to each minority’s population share
in each district. Reservations for women have been implemented in all major states except Bihar
and Uttar Pradesh (which has only reserved 25% of the seats to women).
In West Bengal, the Panchayat Constitution Rule was modiﬁed in 1993 so as to reserve one-
third of the councilor positions in each GP to women, and a share equal to their population for SCs
a n dS T s ;i nat h i r do ft h ev i l l a g e si ne a c hG P ,o n l yw o m e nc o u l db ec a n d i d a t e sf o rt h ep o s i t i o no f
councilor for the area. The proportion of women elected to Panchayat councils increased to 36%
after the 1993 election. The experience was considered a disappointment, however, because very
few women (only 196 out of 3,324 GPs) advanced to the position of Pradhan, which is the only one
that yields eﬀective power (Kanango (1998)). To conform to the 73rd Amendment, the Panchayat
Constitution Rule of West Bengal was again modiﬁed in April of 1998 (Government of West Bengal
(1998)) to introduce reservation of Pradhan positions for women and SC/STs. In Rajasthan, the
random rotation system was implemented in 1995 and in 2000 at both levels (council members and
Pradhans).
In both states, a speciﬁc set of rules ensures the random selection of GPs where the oﬃce of
Pradhan was to be reserved. All GPs in a district are ranked in consecutive order according to
their serial legislative number (an administrative number pre-dating this reform). GPs that have
less than 5% SCs (or STs) are excluded from the list of possible SC (or ST) reservation. A table of
random numbers (in the electoral law) is then used to determine the seats that are to be reserved for
4SCs and STs, according to the numbers that need to be reserved in these particular districts. They
a r et h e nr a n k e di nt h r e es e p a r a t el i s t s ,a c c o r d i n g to whether or not the seats had been reserved for
a SC, for a ST, or are unreserved. Using these lists, every third GP starting with the ﬁrst on the
list is reserved for a woman Pradhan in the ﬁrst election.5
From discussions with government oﬃcials at the Panchayat Directorate who devised the system
and district oﬃcials who implemented it in individual districts, it appears that these instructions
were successfully implemented. More importantly, in the district we study in West Bengal, we
could verify that the policy was strictly implemented. After sorting the GPs into those reserved
for SC/ST and those not reserved, we could reconstruct the entire list of GPs reserved for women
by sorting all GPs by their serial number (allocated several years before the law was passed), and
selecting every third GP starting from the ﬁr s ti ne a c hl i s t .T h i sv e r i ﬁes that the allocation of GPs
to the reserved list was indeed random, as intended.6
Table 1, panel A shows the number of female Pradhans in reserved and unreserved GPs in the
two districts we study. In both districts, all Pradhans in GPs reserved for a woman are female. In
West Bengal, only 6.5% of the Pradhans are female in unreserved GPs. In Rajasthan, only one
woman was elected on an unreserved seat, despite the fact that this was the second cycle. Women
elected once due to the reservation system were not re-elected.7 Panel B shows the number of SC
Pradhans in Birbhum, in reserved and unreserved areas. Again, the policy dramatically increased
the fraction of SC Pradhans in reserved areas. In this paper, we will focus on reservation for SC,
rather than ST, because all GPs in Birbhum have more than 5% SC, so that no GP is excluded
from being reserved. However, many GPs have less than 5% ST, so that the number of GPs in our
study would be too small.8
3 Data Collection
We collected data in two locations: Birbhum in West Bengal and Udaipur in Rajasthan. In the
summer of 2000, we conducted a survey of all GPs in the district of Birbhum, West Bengal. Birbhum
is located in the western part of West Bengal, about 125 miles from the state capital, Calcutta. At
the time of the 1991 census, it had a population of 2.56 million. Agriculture is the main economic
activity, and rice is the main crop cultivated. The male and female literacy rates were 50% and
37%, respectively. The district is known to have a relatively well-functioning Panchayat system.
There are 166 GPs in Birbhum, of which ﬁve were reserved for pre-testing, leaving 161 GPs in
our study. Table 2 shows the means of the most relevant village variables collected by the 1991
census of India in GPs reserved for women and GP that are not reserved, and their diﬀerences. As
5For the next election, every third GP starting with the second on the list was reserved for a woman, etc. The
Panchayat Constitution Rule has actual tables indicating the ranks of the GPs to be reserved in each election.
6We could not obtain the necessary information to perform the same exercise in Rajasthan. However, there too,
the system appears to have been correctly implemented.
7The one woman elected on an unreserved seat was not previously elected on a reserved seat.
8In future work, we will address this question in Rajasthan.
5expected, given the random selection of GPs, there are no important diﬀerences between reserved
and unreserved GPs.9 Note that very few villages (3% among the unreserved GPs) have tap water,
the most common sources of drinking water being hand-pumps and tube wells. Most villages are
accessible only by a dirt road. Ninety-one percent of villages have a primary school, but very few
have any other type of school. Irrigation is important; 43% of the cultivated land is irrigated, with
at least some land being irrigated in all villages. Very few villages (8%) have any public health
facilities.
We collected the data in two stages. First, we conducted an interview with the GP Pradhan.
We asked each one a set of questions about his or her family background, education, previous
political experience, and political ambitions, as well as a set of questions about the activities of the
GP since his or her election in May 1998 (with support from written records). We then completed
a survey of three villages in the GP: Two villages randomly selected in each GP, as well as the
village in which the GP Pradhan resides. During the village interview, we drew a resource map of
the village with a group of 10 to 20 villagers. The map featured all the available infrastructure in
the village, and we asked whether each of the available equipment items had been built or repaired
since May, 1998. Previous experience of one of the authors, as well as experimentation during
the pre-testing period, suggested that this method yields extremely accurate information about
the village. We then conducted an additional interview with the most active participants of the
mapping exercise, in which we asked in more detail about investments in various public goods. We
also collected the minutes of village meetings, and asked whether women and men of the village had
expressed complaints or requests to the GP in the previous six months. For all outcomes for which
it was possible, we collected the same information at the GP-level and at the village-level. The
village-level information is likely to be more reliable, because it is not provided by the Pradhan,
and because it was easy for villagers to recall investments made in their village in the previous two
years. However, the information given by the GP head refers to investment in the entire GP, and is
thus free from sampling error. Therefore, when an outcome is available at both levels, we perform
the analysis separately for both and compare the results.
Between August and December of 2002, we collected the same village-level data (there was no
Pradhan interview) in 100 hamlets in Udaipur, Rajasthan, chosen randomly in a subset of villages
c o v e r e db yal o c a lN G O ,S e v aM a n d i r . 10 The reference period for asking about investment was
also two years, 2000-2002. In Rajasthan, there was no regularly elected Panchayat system until
1995. Table 2 displays the characteristics of villages reserved for women and unreserved in our
9The standard errors are omitted from the table for clarity, but none of the diﬀerences are signiﬁcant at the 95%
conﬁdence level.
10Rajasthani villages are much more spread out than West Bengali villages (a Rajasthani village covers an area on
average 10 times bigger than a West Bengali village) and are much less densely populated. They are made of a series
of independent “hamlets”, which are not administrative entities but function as independent villages. Our sampling
unit is the hamlet: We ﬁrst sampled 100 villages (with probability of selection weighted by village size) and then one
hamlet per village (again, the probability of selection was weighted by village size).
6sample.11 Udaipur is a much poorer district than Birbhum. It is located in an extremely arid
area with little irrigation and has male and female literacy rates of 27.5% and 5.5% respectively.
Because the villages are bigger, they are more likely to have a middle school, a health facility and
a road connection, compared to villages in West Bengal. As in Rajasthan, we see no diﬀerence
between the characteristics of reserved and unreserved villages before the reservation policy was
implemented.
4F i n d i n g s
In the absence of reservation, if we found that diﬀerent public goods investments are undertaken
in GPs that elect women and SCs, compared to GPs that do not, it would be very diﬃcult to
interpret these results, since the few places that elect women or SCs are presumably very diﬀerent
from places that do not elect women. For example, places that are dominated by SCs may elect a
SC Pradhan and also invest more in the SC hamlet, but this would not imply that if we constrain
random places to elect a SC Pradhans, the Pradhan will have any power to implement the policy
he chooses. By contrast, in this case, because the reserved seats were randomly assigned, we can
now compare the outcome in GPs where the position of Pradhan is reserved for a woman or a SC
to those where it is not reserved, and be conﬁdent that any diﬀerence reﬂects only the impact of
the reservation policy.
4.1 Reservation for Women
4.1.1 Effects on the Political Participation of Women
Table 3 displays the eﬀect of having a woman Pradhan on the political participation of women.
Columns (1) and (2) display the average participation rates in reserved and unreserved GPs, respec-
tively. Column (3) displays the diﬀerence. Diﬀerences that are signiﬁcant at the 95% conﬁdence
interval, using standard signiﬁcance tests, are in bold. In West Bengal, the percentage of women
among participants in the Gram Samsad is signiﬁcantly higher when the Pradhan is a woman
(increasing from 6.9% to 9.9%). Since reservation does not aﬀect the percentage of eligible voters
attending the Gram Samsad, this corresponds to a net increase in the participation of women, and
a decline in the participation of men. This is consistent with the idea that political communication
is inﬂuenced by the fact that citizens and leaders are of the same sex. Women in villages with
reserved Pradhans are twice as likely to have addressed a request or a complaint to the GP Prad-
han in the previous six months, and this diﬀerence is signiﬁcant.12 T h ef a c tt h a tt h eP r a d h a ni sa
woman therefore signiﬁcantly increases the involvement of women in the aﬀairs of the GP in West
Bengal.
11For Udaipur, we could not obtain the data necessary to match villages to Panchayat in the entire district.
12In the subsample of villages in which we conducted follow-up surveys, we also asked whether men had brought
up any issue in the previous six months. In all cases but one (a reserved GP), they had.
7In Rajasthan, the fact that the Pradhan is a woman has no eﬀect on women’s participation at
the Gram Samsad or the occurrence of women’s complaints. Note that women participate more
in the Gram Samsad in Rajasthan, most probably because the process is very recent, and the GP
leaders are trained to mobilize women in public meetings.13
4.1.2 Requests of Men and Women
Table 4 shows the fraction of formal requests by type of good made by villagers to the Panchayat
in the six months prior to the survey.14
In West Bengal, drinking water and roads were by far the issues most frequently raised by
women. The next most important issue was welfare programs, followed by housing and electricity.
In Rajasthan, drinking water, welfare programs, and roads were the issues most frequently raised by
women. The issues most frequently raised by men in West Bengal were roads, irrigation, drinking
water, and education. With the exception of irrigation, men have the same priorities in Rajasthan.
Note that these patterns of preferences are expected, in view of the activities of both men and
women in these areas. Women are in charge of collecting drinking water, and they are the primary
recipients of welfare programs (maternity pension, widow’s pension, and old age pension for the
destitute, who tend to be women). In West Bengal, they are the main source of labor employed
on the roads. In Rajasthan, both men and women work on roads, and the employment motive is
t h e r e f o r ec o m m o nt ob o t h . H o w e v e r ,m e nt r a v e lv e r yf r e q u e n t l yo u to ft h ev i l l a g e si ns e a r c ho f
work, while women do not travel long distances; accordingly, men have a stronger need for good
roads.
4.1.3 Effects of the Policy on Public Goods Provision
Table 5 presents the eﬀects of the Pradhan’s gender on all public goods investments made by the
GP since the last election in West Bengal and Rajasthan. The ﬁrst column presents the average
number of investments (repair or new construction) in each category in reserved GPs, and the second
presents the same number in unreserved GPs. The third column presents the diﬀerence between the
two. In all cases, the number below the coeﬃcient is the standard error of the estimate. Diﬀerences
in bold are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0 at the 95% level of conﬁdence, using standard signiﬁcance
tests.
In both West Bengal and Rajasthan, the gender of the Pradhan aﬀects the provision of public
goods. In both places, there are signiﬁcantly more investments in drinking water in GPs reserved
for women. This is what we expected, since in both places, women complain more often than men
13Interestingly, women’s participation is signiﬁcantly higher when the position of council member of the village
is reserved for a woman (results not reported to conserve space). This diﬀerence is probably due to the very long
distance between villages in Rajasthan.
14We recorded the exact complaint or request, for example, the need to repair a speciﬁc well. We classiﬁed them ex
post into these categories. In West Bengal, we had initially not asked about issues raised by men: A random subset
of 48 villages was subsequently resurveyed later.
8about water. In West Bengal, GPs are less likely to have set up informal schools (in the village,
this is signiﬁcant only at the 10% level) in GPs reserved for women. Interestingly, the eﬀect of
reservation on the quality of roads is opposite in Rajasthan and in West Bengal; in West Bengal,
roads are signiﬁcantly better in GPs reserved for women, but in Rajasthan, it is the opposite. This
result is important since it corroborates expectations based on the complaint data for men and
women. The only unexpected result is that we do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect of reservation for
women on irrigation in West Bengal. In West Bengal, we run the same regression for GP-level
investments (instead of village-level). The results, presented in panel B, are entirely consistent,
and the eﬀect on informal schooling is signiﬁcant at the 5% level in the GP-level regression.
These results suggest that the reservation policy has important eﬀects on policy decisions at
the local level. These eﬀects are consistent with the policy priorities expressed by women.
4.1.4 Robustness
Some doubt the eﬀectiveness of the reservation policy, citing anecdotal evidence that women Prad-
hans are observed to be subservient to their husbands or other powerful men. As Table 6 shows,
17% of the spouses of the women leaders have previously been elected to the Panchayat. Forty-three
percent of the female leaders acknowledge being helped by their spouse. The interviewers are more
likely to ﬁnd the women hesitant, they are more likely to acknowledge that they did not know how
the GP functioned before being elected and that they do not intend to run again.
However, despite all this, what remains is that women do diﬀerent things than men. This
remains true even for women who say they are helped by their husband or for women whose
husbands were previously elected in the Panchayat.15 We also have good reasons to think that
the eﬀects of the policy are indeed due to the gender of the Pradhan, rather than other aspects of
the reservation policy. In Chattopadhyay and Duﬂo (2003a), we show that the diﬀerence between
men and women remain identical when we restrict the comparison to other men who were elected
recently, men who will not be able to re-elected, or SC/ST Pradhans.
The impression that women are not eﬀective leaders thus seems to stem largely from the social
perceptions of women that the policy precisely tries to address. What these results show is that,
despite the handicaps they may face in terms of education and prior experience, and the precon-
ception of weak leadership, women have a real impact on policy decisions. Using data collected by
the Public Action Center, matched with data on reservation, Topalova (2003) ﬁnds illuminating
results: Not only does she ﬁnd that the quality of water provided is better in GPs that are reserved
for women, and that women are somewhat less likely to demand bribes, but she also ﬁnds that
villagers are less likely to be satisﬁed about the quality of the water when GPs are reserved for
women, despite receiving objectively better service. This suggests that women tend to be consid-
ered as worse policymakers even in cases where they are objectively better. This may explain the
skepticism about the impact of the policy in the face of the evidence.
15Results available from the authors on request.
94.2 Reservation for Scheduled Castes
These results focus on West Bengal, where we have conducted the village survey for the entire
village, and not only for one hamlet per village. Because there are at least 5% of SCs in these
villages, they also focus on reservation for SCs.
4.2.1 Effect on the Type of Public Goods
The ﬁrst question we can ask is whether SC Pradhans, like women Pradhans, choose to invest in
diﬀerent types of public goods than non-SC Pradhans. In Table 7, we reproduce in column (1) the
diﬀerence between GPs reserved to women and unreserved GPs shown in Table 5. In column (2),
we show the same diﬀerence, but for GPs reserved for SCs. In contrast to the previous results, no
diﬀerence is signiﬁcant. We can see that, unlike women, SC Pradhans do not radically change the
types of investment they undertake.
4.2.2 Effect on the Location of Public Goods
We might expect a larger impact, however, on the location of these investments. Speciﬁcally, do
SC Pradhans invest more in SC hamlets? The SC population may not need a diﬀerent set of public
goods than the non-SC population, but they may want these goods to be located in their hamlet,
rather than in the other hamlets in the village. The reservation to a SC Pradhan may ensure that
this happens. When we collected the data in the PRA, we made sure to indicate the location of
each public good: Is it in the SC hamlet, the ST hamlet (if any), the general hamlet, or in common
areas?
To verify that villages were indeed comparable before the reservation was put in place, Table
8 displays information about the location of public goods in these villages before 1998, when the
reservation policy was ﬁrst introduced. For each good, we construct the share of public goods
that are located in the SC area, normalized by the share of the population that lives in the area.
Therefore, an index smaller than 1 suggests that the SC hamlet has fewer goods than one would
expect on the basis of the SC share in the population of the village, and an index higher than 1
suggests that the SC hamlet has more goods than one would expect on the basis of the SC share in
the population of the village. In column (1), we display the normalized share in GPs that were not
reserved for SCs between 1998 and 2003. In column (2), we display the normalized share in GPs
that were reserved for SCs between 1998 and 2003. Because the reservation was randomly assigned,
we do not expect any signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the investment shares between GPs that are reserved
for SCs and GPs that are not reserved for SCs. Three important facts emerge from this table. SCs
get a somewhat smaller share of public goods than non-SC on average (the index for the average
is 0.93), but the index is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 1, and the extent of under-investment in
SC hamlets depends on the types of goods. It seems that in SC hamlets there tends to be more
public provision of goods for which there are private substitutes (drinking water wells, sanitation
equipment) and less public provision for goods for which there are fewer private substitutes (schools,
10adult education). Second, there are much less privately provided equivalents of public goods in SC
hamlets (we have information for water and irrigation equipment). Third, the indices are very
similar in reserved and unreserved GPs, which is reassuring. Before 1998, SC hamlets were not
treated diﬀerently in GPs that were reserved for SCs from 1998 to 2003.
Table 9 displays the normalized investment shares in SC and non-SC GPs, their diﬀerences,
and their ratio. Overall, across all goods, and controlling for the diﬀerence in population share, the
SC hamlet received 14% more investments in goods in GPs reserved for SCs, relative to GPs that
were not reserved for SCs. Note that we have excluded the Pradhan’s village from this sample,
which shows that the observed diﬀerences are not due to the direct eﬀect of the Pradhan putting
more goods next to his own home. Instead, this seems to reﬂect a general tendency to favor the
SC population when the Pradhan position is reserved for SCs. This result is consistent with the
results in Pande (2003), who ﬁnds that there are more transfers targeted to SCs in states where
there are more reservations for SCs in parliament, and of Besley and Rao (2003), who ﬁnd that SC
households are more likely to receive public transfers if the Pradhan is SC.
When we look at diﬀerent goods separately (Table 9), we see that the increase in the share of
public goods going to the SC hamlet in GPs reserved for SCs seems to reﬂect the existing imbalance
across goods: Except for informal schools, where the share is smaller in GPs reserved for SCs, the
share of goods going to the SC hamlet increases for all goods, and it increases more for goods where
the share is already higher in non-reserved hamlets (sanitation, for example). It appears that when
the SCs gain more power, they do not feel the need to radically change the types of goods that
they are getting, but rather to get a little more of everything.
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has shown that reservation for SCs and women in the Panchayati Raj makes a diﬀerence:
Both women and SCs invest more in what women and SCs seem to want (water for women, goods
in SC hamlets for SCs). This underscores the power of the elected Panchayat leaders and, by
implication, the importance of the 73rd Amendment. In this regard, it is particularly important
that the results are comparable in Rajasthan, where the 73rd Amendment was the ﬁrst attempt to
revive the Panchayat structure, and in West Bengal, where it had been active since the late 1970s.
These results also suggest that, given the diﬃculty of targeting public transfers to speciﬁc
groups in an otherwise decentralized system, reservation may be a tool to ensure not only adequate
representation but also adequate delivery of local public goods to disadvantaged groups. They ﬂy
in the face of skepticism founded on anecdotes or prejudice that women or SCs are not capable of
being independent leaders. These results show that, whatever the process underlying the eﬀects
may be, women and SC leaders make a diﬀerence on the ground. Correcting imbalance in political
agency does result in correcting inequities in other spheres as well (Sen (1999)).
In this light, recent developments that try to tag other objectives onto the reservation policy
are troubling. Six states (Haryana, Rajasthan, Andhra Pradesh, Orissa and Madhya Pradesh, and
11Himachal Pradesh) now have laws mandating a two-child norm for members of the Panchayat. As
we can see in Table 6, women and men Pradhans have the same number of children on average
(around 2.5 in West Bengal). Since women do not necessarily control their fertility choices, and
are unlikely to ﬁnd it worthwhile to ﬁght their family in order to be eligible for the Panchayat,
this policy is likely to discourage women, or members of the SCs and STs, from being candidates,
even when there is reservation, thus encouraging the situations that critics of the reservation policy
describe, where “puppet candidates” will take the place of real candidates. De facto, it will thus
reduce women’s agency and, if anything, may result in an increase in fertility, rather than the
opposite.16
This would be an unfortunate outcome, given the evidence that Panchayat leaders make a
diﬀerence and that bringing women and SCs into politics may help in improving their welfare.
Reduced fertility may be achieved by increasing women’s bargaining power in the family, and an
eﬀective democracy with adequate women’s representation may be more eﬀective at achieving it
than regulation that takes away from women and SCs what the 73rd Amendment guarantees them.
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13Table 1
Reserved Unreserved
For women For women
(1) (2)
A. WOMEN'S RESERVATION AND MEN'S REPRESENTATION
West Bengal
Total number  54 107
Proportion of female Pradhans 100% 6.5%
Rajasthan
Total number 40 60
Proportion of female Pradhans 100% 1.7%
B. SC RESERVATION AND SC REPRESENTATION
Reserved Non reserved
for SC for SC
West Bengal
Total number  55 106
% SC 100 7.5   Table 2
Mean, reserved Mean, unreserved Difference Mean, reserved Mean, unreserved Difference
GP GP GP GP
Dependent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total population 974 1022 -49 1249 1564 -315
Female literacy rate 0.35 0.34 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.00
Male literacy rate 0.57 0.58 -0.01 0.28 0.26 0.03
% cultivated land that is irrigated 0.45 0.43 0.02 0.05 0.07 -0.02
Dirt road 0.92 0.91 0.01 0.40 0.52 -0.11
Metal road 0.18 0.15 0.03 0.31 0.34 -0.04
Bus stop or train station 0.31 0.26 0.05 0.40 0.43 -0.03
Number of public health facilities 0.06 0.08 -0.02 0.29 0.19 0.10
Tube well is available 0.05 0.07 -0.02 0.02 0.03 -0.01
Handpump is available 0.84 0.88 -0.04 0.90 0.97 -0.06
Wells 0.44 0.47 -0.02 0.93 0.91 0.01
Tap water 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.12 0.09 0.03
Number of primary schools 0.95 0.91 0.04 0.93 1.16 -0.23
Number of middle schools 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.43 0.33 0.10
Number of high schools 0.09 0.10 -0.01 0.14 0.07 0.07
Notes:
1.  There are  2,120 observations in the West Bengal regressions, and 100 in the Rajasthan regressions.
West Bengal RajasthanTable 3
Mean, reserved Mean, unreserved Difference
GP GP
Dependent variables (1) (2) (3)
WEST BENGAL
Fraction of women among participants in the 9.80 6.88 2.92
   Gram Samsad (in percentage)
Have women filed a complaint to 0.20 0.11 0.09
   the GP in the previous 6 months?
Have men filed a complaint to the GP in the  0.94 1.00 0.06
   previous 6 months?
Observations 54 107
RAJASTHAN
Fraction of women among participants in 20.41 24.49 -0.04
   the Gram Samsad (in percentage)
Have women filed a complaint to 0.64 0.62 0.02
   the GP in the previous 6 months?
Have men filed a complaint to the GP  0.95 0.88 0.073
   previous 6 months?
Observations 40 60Table 4
Women Men Women Men
All All
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ALL PROGRAMS
Public works 0.84 0.85 0.62 0.87
Welfare programs 0.10 0.04 0.19 0.03
Child care 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.01
Health 0.04 0.02 0.07 0.04
Credit or employment 0.01 0.09 0.05 0.04
BREAKDOWN OF PUBLIC WORKS ISSUES
Drinking water 0.31 0.17 0.54 0.43
Road improvement 0.31 0.25 0.13 0.23
Housing 0.11 0.05 0.03 0.04
Electricity 0.08 0.10 0.03 0.02
Irrigation and ponds 0.04 0.20 0.02 0.04
Education 0.06 0.12 0.05 0.13
Adult education  0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Other 0.10 0.09 0.20 0.12
Notes:
1.  Each cell lists the number of times an issue was mentioned, divided by the total number of issues in each panel
2.  The data for men in West Bengal comes from a subsample of 48 villages.Table 5
Mean, reserved Mean, unreserved Difference Mean, reserved Mean, unreserved Difference
Dependent variables GP GP GP GP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. VILLAGE LEVEL
Number of drinking water facilities  23.83 14.74 9.09 7.31 4.69 2.62
   newly built or repaired (5.00) (1.44) (4.02) (.93) (.44) (.95)
Condition of roads (1 if in good  0.41 0.23 0.18 0.90 0.98 -0.08
   condition) (.05) (.03) (.06) (.05) (.02) (.04)
Number of Panchayat-run  0.06 0.12 -0.06
   education centers (.02) (.03) (.04)
Number of irrigation facilities 3.01 3.39 -0.38 0.88 0.90 -0.02
   newly built or repaired (.79) (.8) (1.26) (.05) (.04) (.06)
Other public goods (ponds, biogas, sanitation, 1.66 1.34 0.32 0.19 0.14 0.05
   community buildings) (.49) (.23) (.48) (.07) (.06) (.09)
B. GP LEVEL
1 if a new tubewell was built 1.00 0.93 0.07
(.02) (.03)
1 if a metal road was built or repaired 0.67 0.48 0.19
(.06) (.05) (.08)
1 if there is an informal education 0.67 0.82 -0.16
    center in the GP (.06) (.04) (.07)
1 if at least one  irrigation pump was built 0.17 0.09 0.07
(.05) (.03) (.05)
Notes:
1.  Standard errors in parentheses.
2.  In West Bengal, there are 322 observations in the village-level regressions, and 161 in the GP level regressions.
     There are 100 observations in the Rajasthan regressions.
3.  Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the GP level in the village-level regressions for the West Bengal regressions, using the Moulton (1986) formula.
West Bengal RajasthanTable 6
Mean, reserved Mean, unreserved Difference
GP GP
Dependent variables (1) (2) (3)
A. PRADHAN'S BACKGROUND
Age 31.87 39.72 -7.85
Years of Education 7.13 9.92 -2.79
Literacy 0.80 0.98 -0.19
Married 0.89 0.87 0.02
Number of children 2.45 2.50 -0.05
Below poverty line 0.46 0.28 0.18
Number of household assets 1.72 2.36 -0.64
Population of Pradhan's own village 1554 2108 -554
Hesitates when answering the questions 0.75 0.41 0.34
    (interviewer's impression)
B. PRADHAN'S POLITICAL ASPIRATIONS AND EXPERIENCE
Was elected to the GP council 0.11 0.43 -0.32
   before 1998
Was elected Pradhan before 1998 0.00 0.12 -0.12
Took part in Panchayat activities 0.28 0.78 -0.50
   prior to being elected
Knew how GP functioned 0.00 0.35 -0.35
Did not receive any formal training 0.06 0.00 0.06
Spouse ever elected to the Panchayat 0.17 0.02 0.15
Spouse helps 0.43 0.13 0.30
Will not run again 0.33 0.21 0.13
C. PRADHAN'S POLITICAL PARTY
Left Front 0.69 0.69 -0.01







Number of drinking water facilities newly built or repaired 9.09 4.83
    (4.02) (4.66)
Number of irrigation facilities newly built or repaired -0.36 0.85
(1.27) (1.38)
Condition of roads (1 if in good condition) 0.18 -0.09
(.06) (.06)
Number of informal education centers -0.06 -0.02
(.04) (.05)
B. GP LEVEL
1 if a new tubewell was built 0.06 0.03
(.03) (.04)
1 if at least one  irrigation pump was built 0.08 -0.09
(.05) (.06)
1 if a metal road was built or repaired 0.18 -0.11
(.08) (.08)




SC unreserved SC reserved Difference
(1) (2) (3)
Private Drinking Water 0.399 0.460 0.061
Public Drinking Water 1.219 1.327 0.109
Private Irrigation 0.478 0.213 -0.265
Public Irrigation 0.959 0.589 -0.370
Sanitation 2.072 2.284 0.213
Informal Education 1.067 0.470 -0.597
Adult Education 0.804 1.588 0.784
Formal Education 0.755 0.733 -0.022
Average all goods 0.809 0.820 0.011
Average all private goods 0.413 0.372 -0.040
Average all public goods 0.927 0.953 0.026
Share of goods available before 1998 
in SC hamlets (normalized by SC share)Table 9
Not reserved for SC Reserved for SC Difference Ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Public goods built and repaired
Public Drinking Water 1.049 1.540 0.491 1.468
Public Irrigation 0.521 0.731 0.210 1.403
Sanitation 2.561 4.880 2.319 1.905
Informal Education 1.061 0.818 -0.243 0.771
Adult Education 0.697 1.048 0.350 1.502
Formal Education 0.727 0.983 0.256 1.352
Overall Difference (across all goods) 0.14
Normalized share